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November 2002
VVAF is proud to bring you the first in a series of
technical reports about the work that our Information
Management & Mine Action Programs (iMMAP) is 
doing to support humanitarian decision makers 
and stakeholders.  
Our vision for this series, titled Navigating Post-Conflict Environments: Humanitarian Information
Management, is to make a fundamental contribution to the evolution of information management
and decision support in complex emergency and development scenarios.  Begun as sporadic, ad
hoc projects initiated amidst various humanitarian crises, information management and decision
support are growing into foundational pillars of the relief and development continuum.
VVAF’s leadership roles with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Ottawa Treaty, as well as its
efforts to foster the development of the Landmine Impact Survey concept, initiated in 1998, provided the
foundation for iMMAP’s creation. iMMAP’s resources include a diverse team of recognized experts in social
science, survey, statistics, Geographic Information Systems (GIS), information and program management, public
health, water supply and sanitation, and emergency relief. The iMMAP team also provides survey, information and
program management training around the world.
iMMAP coordinates humanitarian information management activities in developing countries, and conducts and
supports landmine impact and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) surveys. iMMAP’s work forms a basis for setting
priorities for humanitarian mine action and relief response, and guides the application of scarce resources to
maximum effect.
I invite you to read, enjoy and learn from this report, and we welcome comments.
Sincerely,
Bobby Muller, President
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
Garic’s body is a story of long, crossed scars. One scar Garic received from a fragment of
an exploding mine while he was escaping his bombarded village outside Kosovo. Because
he has spent so much time in hospitals, Garic has never gone to school. Now he is able to
attend classes, but too old for first grade and not educated enough to study with students
his age.
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A I M S Afghanistan Information Management Service
CBU Cluster  Bomb Unit   
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EU European Union
GICHD Geneva Internat ional  Centre for  Humanitar ian Demining
GIS Geographic Information System
HCIC Humanitar ian Community Information Centre
HMA Humanitar ian Mine Act ion
ICRC Internat ional  Committee of  the Red Cross
iMMAP Information Management & Mine Act ion Programs 
IMSMA Information Management System for  Mine Act ion
MRE Mine Risk Educat ion
NATO North At lant ic  Treaty Organizat ion
NGO Non-Governmental  Organizat ion
OAS Organizat ion of  American States 
UN United Nat ions
UNHCR United Nat ions High Commissioner for  Refugees
UNMACC United Nat ions Mine Act ion Coordinat ion Center
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VVAF Vietnam Veterans of  America Foundat ion
WHO World Health Organizat ion
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INTRODUCTION
Shortly after deploying the first-ever landmine impact
survey team to the field in Yemen during July 1999,
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) was
asked by the European Union and the U.S. State
Department’s Office for Global Humanitarian Demining
Programs to make a critical contribution to the
international response in the province of Kosovo in the
former Republic of Yugoslavia. The mission: to classify
affected communities in Kosovo by the severity of
socio-economic impacts caused by landmines and
unexploded ordnance (UXO) and develop a system for
prioritizing the tasks that the United Nations Mine
Action Coordination Center (UNMACC) managed.
The humanitarian microcosm of Kosovo offered a
unique opportunity in the maturing mine action sector.
The major threat of landmines and UXO was overcome
within two and a half years, between mid-1999 and
late-2001, whereas mine action programs in most other
countries seem destined to continue for periods of two
decades or more. In Kosovo, VVAF demonstrated that
humanitarian mine action management can be
significantly enhanced with modern information
management and decision support tools.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Among the many and diverse inputs to the mine action
process in Kosovo were:
■ The rapid introduction of unique database
software, the Information Management System for
Mine Action (IMSMA), to serve as UNMACC’s sole
information management application; and 
■ VVAF’s intervention to develop impact-founded
priority scores and categories, together with
operational data, and thus support UNMACC’s
establishment of a prioritized tasking system. 
THE RESPONSE
As a VVAF partner recently remarked, the humanitarian
world is several years behind other similar movements
in the adoption of formal decision support systems.
However, among humanitarian sectors, the mine 
action community is among the most successful in
working to eliminate this capability gap, and the
Kosovo response represents one small, though
important, step forward in this pursuit.
Kosovo is billed as a mine action success, as the major
threat of landmines and UXO was eliminated within
two and a half years – a sprint in the mine action
context. During this period, UNMACC used the IMSMA
application to keep track of the thousands of
dangerous areas for which VVAF helped to compute
priority scores, together with operational data. This
data is the basis for the analysis that we present here
to illustrate the weight of survey-based priorities
relative to other considerations.
Kosovo also presented a unique situation from an
impact survey standpoint. Engaged military forces had
greater knowledge of contaminated areas than local
residents did, many having just returned from refugee
camps, a situation converse to most impact survey
scenarios. Military and political organizations made
bombing data and satellite and aerial imagery
available in significant quantities for the first time.
More than 300 relief organizations rushed to intervene,
including at least 20 focused on mine action, and other
resources including funding were in better-than-normal
supply. Initially, there were reported to be more than
4,000 contaminated areas in Kosovo.
The international mine action community made a
number of decisions that brought this complex
situation under control. Coordination was to be
separate from implementation. IMSMA was
introduced. Overlapping, false, or duplicated
dangerous area records were winnowed down to a
number accepted as accurate, from more than 4,000 to
just under 2,000. By the end of the UN mine action
coordination mandate in December 2001, 1,951
dangerous areas had been cleared, and another 276
were awaiting clearance by Kosovo authorities.
VVAF’S CONTRIBUTION
Given the lack of knowledgeable community
informants, due to the displacement of major
segments of the population during hostilities, the
normal impact survey methodology could not be
applied in Kosovo. Hence, VVAF developed a process
that integrated existing data collection efforts in
support of IMSMA, and produced a socio-economic
index of landmine and UXO impacts. Data streams
from the United Nations’ Humanitarian Community
Information Centre (HCIC), other UN agencies, NATO,
and mine action NGO’s converged at the VVAF desk in
UNMACC to contribute information to IMSMA,
providing the first-ever practical impact survey result.
To meet its vexing challenges in the Kosovo mine
action response, VVAF deployed Shawn Messick to
work full-time with UNMACC. One of the very few
internationally recognized humanitarian information
management experts, Messick created a decision
support tool for allocating clearance resources in time
to support the beginning of the spring demining
season in February 2001. Along the way, VVAF learned
several important lessons in this immature field. 
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Data acquisition took longer than was previously
expected. Practical "give-and-take" opportunities had to
be created among stakeholders. In fact, Messick coined
the phrase "data diplomacy" – now enshrined in the
iMMAP lexicon – to describe his creative methods for
interagency data sharing.
A great challenge was to filter out information that did
not add value to the mine action effort. To counter this
challenge, a simple, coherent environmental model
was required to provide effective decision support.
VVAF invented the concept of "essential livelihood
space" and computed priority scores from the
relationships between dangerous areas and
components of that space.
Lacking well-defined communities and knowledgeable
key informants, VVAF founded its analysis of impacts
upon physical features such as bounded dangerous
areas, land use, and political boundaries which were
then overlaid in a Geographic Information System
(GIS) and compared. Assumptions were then made
about the behavior of people within these given
spaces, allowing conclusions to be drawn regarding
socio-economic impact. Based on expected behaviors
in a particular "essential livelihood space," intersecting
with contamination, an index was formed that
assigned points to each dangerous area. This analytical
method, through its consideration of blocked resources
and facilities, is a methodological descendant of
landmine impact scoring.
VVAF explored two avenues of practical decision
support. The first was to classify districts and draw
attention to those most affected. The second was to
classify each dangerous area. A weighting scheme
assigned points for each category of land type (buffer)
with which the contaminated area intersected. The sum
of these assigned points formed the priority scores,
which were bracketed into low-, medium- and high-
priority ranges. The UNMACC Operations Unit then
created a management tool known as the "task folder,"
containing all the information collected and processed
regarding danger areas that could be efficiently treated
as one task. These could be single areas clearly
isolated from others, or multiple areas that were
nearby, overlapping, or potentially duplicated.
In Kosovo, VVAF and other stakeholders were faced
with multidimensional decision requirements, some of
which were resource-driven, others responses to short-
term tasks, and some related to a desired end state.
Managing this complex environment produced a
distinction between policy and operational
considerations. On the policy side, aside from the
socio-economic priority scores, type of munitions
exerted a strong influence on the timing of clearance.
UNMACC decided to focus on the removal of cluster
munitions before vegetation growth during the spring
of 2000 would make them less visible and thus more
dangerous. Under the operational heading, issues such
as set-up costs, ambulance positioning and slope
influenced the decision-making process, particularly 
in terms of specialized resources required for 
particular tasks.
One of the highlights of this successful humanitarian
mine action intervention was that its clearance record
remains documented in great detail.This data
permitted the kinds of statistical analyses on which the
conclusions of this report are based. A continuous and
traceable straight line runs from data collection
through management in IMSMA, and evaluation with
the help of GIS and of the VVAF-developed decision
support tool, to the final survival analysis model. This,
in turn, was borrowed from epidemiology and was –
we believe - creatively applied to landmine and UXO
clearance reports. 
Admittedly very technical, the survival model
demonstrates the mark that VVAF’s assistance in
prioritizing dangerous areas had upon the way the
contamination was all but eliminated in Kosovo. The
results lead us to believe that model-supported and
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even model-driven information management fills a
need not only for humanitarian decision-making, but
also for concurrent accountability.
THE ROAD TO THE FUTURE
From VVAF activities in Kosovo, a number of insights
emerge that will likely prove valid for information
management and decision support in future post-war
reconstruction scenarios. The close intermingling of
policy and operational factors will heat up the debate
about the relationship between impact surveys and
technical surveys. Implementers of impact and
technical surveys will attempt to leverage the
perceived strengths of their mutual contributions.
Technical surveys will be used to identify, within highly
affected communities, those areas that deserve priority
clearance on both socio-economic and technical
grounds. It relegates other areas in the same
communities to delayed clearance and/or marking.
Another insight concerns the relationship between
mine action and other humanitarian sectors. As
compared to other similar efforts, the use of IMSMA 
in Kosovo placed UNMACC and the mine action
community on the leading edge of information
technology operations in humanitarian applications.
One of VVAF’s chief contributions was to create a
quantitative scoring system for dangerous areas,
derived from the sociological model of an "essential
livelihood space" and drawing on the populated
IMSMA database.
VVAF has derived the primary ingredients for
improved decision making in mine action from the
Kosovo experience. Further development of survey
methodologies within mine action and beyond is
necessary, a lesson VVAF is applying now in
Afghanistan and other countries. Information
management should be improved through further
development of IMSMA, and selective transfers of
elements to and from it, notably on a GIS platform.
And, the development – opportunistically where it
promises net benefits – of decision support tools that
formalize the creation and evaluation of practical
alternatives is critical.
In future mine action interventions, the scope and
sequence of survey types may change. In addition 
to enhanced technical surveys, we may see a split
between stripped-down rapid emergency surveys 
with some socio-economic component and more
comprehensive surveys that correlate data on
explosive remnants of war with information bodies
from other sectors such as agricultural or public 
health surveys. Such opportunities for combination are
essentially unpredictable, but must be actively seized.
In Kosovo, VVAF has played a key role in translating
from information to knowledge. As opportunities 
arise, VVAF is well placed to create added value as 
a bridge builder between IMSMA and other sources of
relevant data holdings. Through this improved
integration with other sectors, the rigor and discipline
of information management in mine action can be
applied to their benefit.
In Kosovo, the context of the Landmine Impact Survey
framework is important. By making humanitarian mine
action more efficient, it demonstrates that those who
fought for the Ottawa Convention are capable of
sustaining its implementation on the ground. By
exploiting a technological edge, the mine action
community is setting an example that other
humanitarian sectors can emulate for the development
of decision support tools. These may be sector-specific
or, in favorable situations, even bring information
bodies from several sectors into mutual
communication and support. And finally, there is the
economics of decision support tools. Tools like the
priority scoring in Kosovo focus information collection
on the narrow set of "need-to-know" items that their
conceptual models single out as fundamental for
decision-making. VVAF is confident that post-war
rehabilitation efforts in other countries will benefit by
further developing what worked in Kosovo.
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■ Mine risk education; 
■ Victim assistance; and 
■ Advocacy. 
The 1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and their Destruction is a milestone 
in international humanitarian advocacy, the fifth of
these pillars.
The Ottawa Convention has had the fastest adoption
rate of all treaties in the history of international law
(Rutherford 2000: 75), with 137 countries signing or
acceding by mid-2000. The Ottawa Convention was
effective in stigmatizing landmines, which helped
boost humanitarian mine action funding worldwide
from an estimated USD 20 million per year in the early
nineties to more than USD 200 million per year by the
end of the decade. The tenfold increase in donor
support naturally came with greater concerns for
effectiveness and efficiency of mine action, particularly
in its most expensive and dangerous component – 
the clearance of landmines and Unexploded 
Ordnance (UXO). 
INTRODUCTION
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The humanitarian mine action community responded
in several ways. With leadership provided by the
United Nations, international standards have been
enacted for clearance, mine risk education, and
stockpile destruction. Non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), including VVAF, launched the Global Landmine
Survey initiative, a series of country-specific surveys
intended to create a complete inventory of mine- and
UXO-contaminated communities in the worst affected
countries and prioritize them for mitigation. VVAF has
been a leading partner in several complete country
surveys that have been certified through a United
Nations quality-assurance process – Yemen, Chad, and
Thailand – and has contributed quality assurance
services to the survey in Mozambique. Currently, VVAF
is supporting or conducting surveys in Lebanon and
Armenia, and is preparing to survey Vietnam.
One of the products of the Global Landmine Survey
consists of a classification, within each country, of
affected communities by the severity of socio-
economic impacts. The impacts that landmines and
UXO create for the social and economic life of the
communities are expressed in a numerical score that
considers the broad nature of munitions, the resources
and facilities blocked, and the number of recent
victims. The scores are used to assign communities to
low-, medium- and high-impact categories, following 
a system that is coherent across countries while
allowing for the expression of local specifics. VVAF
played a key role in developing and refining this
system and disseminating it to survey 
implementation organizations.
Impact scores and categories, together with
operational data, are made available to national mine
action planners through a unique database called the
Information Management System for Mine Action
(IMSMA). Sponsored by the Geneva International
Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and
developed by the Center for Security Studies and
Conflict Resolution at the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology Zurich, IMSMA has become the global
standard for this sector. It supports the entire mine
action process - from the early collection of
information pointing to the presence of landmines and
UXO (e.g. entering minefield and air strike records)
during and soon after a conflict until a historical record
has been created that lists all known cleared
minefields. This facilitates dialogue among donors,
national authorities and field operators. The impact
score serves as the vehicle for a rational strategy to
allocate resources for the elimination of mine impacts.
This strategy is distinct from, and more efficient than,
attempts to clear all suspected land, even areas far
from human settlement or intensive agriculture.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that, in the past, the mine
action community has indeed used the results of
national impact surveys in formulating strategy,
communicating with donors, and planning and
implementing operations. For example, shortly after
the Yemen Landmine Impact Survey report was
publicized, donors underwrote the first two years of a
national action plan for that country. The importance of
timely incorporation of survey results into national
strategic planning was tragically underscored when
central highland communities, which the survey had
rated as highly impacted, received attention only after
they had been identified as accounting for 90% of all
victims of landmine incidents that had occurred since
the survey’s conclusion.
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A unique opportunity to evaluate the influence that
impact surveys exert on the actual behavior of mine
action partners arose in Kosovo. Located in the former
Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo was fortunate to have
most of the threat from landmines and UXO removed
within less than three years after the United Nations
took charge of the province under Security Council
Resolution 1244. Soon after the United Nations Mine
Action Coordination Center (UNMACC) was
established, VVAF assisted it in information
management and analysis. UNMACC then used the
IMSMA application to keep track of the thousands of
dangerous areas for which VVAF helped to compute
priority scores, together with operational data. This
data is the basis for the analysis that we present 
here to demonstrate the weight of survey-based
priorities relative to other considerations that are
equally necessary. 
Figure 1: Contaminated Districts in Kosovo
A map that many visitors to the United Nations’ Mine Action Coordination Center in Kosovo will remember, created by VVAF in
early 2000.
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VVAF’s concern for such a retrospective analysis is
motivated not only by its own involvement in this
particular mine action scenario. The Kosovo project
was a step in the search for a viable paradigm for post-
war reconstruction and for the place that VVAF may
find in it; mine action belongs there, as does the
support that VVAF is lending the United Nations for
better humanitarian information management in
Afghanistan. The priority scoring moves IMSMA from
an information management system to a decision
support tool. As one of our partners recently remarked,
the humanitarian world is about six years behind other
movements, such as environmental conservation, in
the adoption of formal decision support systems. If
Kosovo (and other mine action scenarios) proves the
value of impact surveys, two conclusions follow: After
the international community embraced the ban on
landmines, it became possible to work out strategies to
efficiently tackle their deadly legacy. And further, VVAF
has made a small contribution to modernizing
decision-making for post-war rehabilitation.
Figure 2: From Impact Surveys to Clearance
Counting from the start of the UN Mine Action Coordination Center, the half-life (time required to clear half) for high-priority
dangerous areas was 467 days. That for medium-priority areas was somewhat longer—505 days. In contrast, the half-life of low-
priority areas was 613 days—about 5 months longer than for high-priority areas. 
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Kosovo is generally billed as a humanitarian mine
action success story. The major threat of landmines
and UXO was overcome within two and a half years,
from the middle of 1999 to the end of 2001. Victims
from landmine and UXO accidents decreased sharply
after the first six months of emergency work. As part of
a deliberate exit strategy (Flannagan 2001), a local
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity is in place
to address the small residual threat.
At the same time, many regard Kosovo as a unique
situation from which it is difficult to learn lessons that
would be applicable to other post-war rehabilitation
scenarios – in mine action or in other sectors. Located
in the backyard of affluent Western Europe, the
province received strong donor interest and a rapid
operational response. The United Nations took full
authority in civilian administration, insulating
humanitarian decision-making from the play of local
politics. Atypically for mine action and the usual
impact survey assumptions, foreign armed forces had
greater knowledge of contaminated areas than local
residents did, many of whom had recently returned
from refugee camps. Military and political
organizations made bombing data and satellite and
aerial imagery available - tools that have previously
HUMANITARIAN MINE
ACTION IN KOSOVO
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been largely out of reach of humanitarian
organizations and which also became an integral part
of VVAF’s work in the Kosovo mine action response.
At the same time, Kosovo presented a number of
challenges that are not uncommon to other post-war
rehabilitation theaters. The figure 300 has often been
touted for the number of relief organizations that
rushed to this comparatively small emergency
situation. In mine clearance alone, some twenty
military, commercial, and NGO entities shared in the
task. Together, they generated an enormous amount of
information. Various sources contributed records of
more than 4,000 dangerous areas – minefields, cluster
bomb strike zones, and other UXO contamination. In
addition, donors had competing priorities, and NGOs
vied for profile and attention.
The international mine action community made a
number of institutional and management decisions
that helped mitigate the initial complexity. The United
Nations, which established UNMACC just hours after
NATO troops reached the capital Pristina, was given
full authority to coordinate donors and to accredit and
coordinate clearance operators, which enabled it to
enforce quality standards. Although UNMACC decided
clearance tasks in dialogue with its affiliate partners,
implementation was carried out separately, as
UNMACC itself held no clearance assets.
With assistance from GICHD, UNMACC immediately
introduced IMSMA as its sole information
management application. This was desperately needed
in order to sort numerous streams of relevant data and
translate them into a continuous issuance of survey
and clearance tasks. It was soon posited that between
30 and 50 percent of the initial dangerous area records
were duplicate, overlapping or false. UNMACC took
until November 1999 to winnow the list of more than
4,000 records down to 1,926 (this number was
eventually raised to 1,951 when additional areas were
reported). Still, there was a considerable overlap factor
not yet clarified by field reconnaissance. VVAF’s Mine
Action Information Consultant Shawn Messick, one of
the very few internationally recognized humanitarian
information management experts, calculated 361
square kilometers of composite contaminated area, or
602 square kilometers with overlap.
1999 was the year of the emergency phase in the
Kosovo mine action response. The HALO Trust, a United
Kingdom-based mine action NGO, conducted a rapid
survey in June. While it did not supply much in the
way of socio-economic information, it was invaluable
for assessing the road network and determining
priority clearance tasks for the safe delivery of relief
goods in the preparations for the onset of winter.
Other organizations concentrated on schools and
private residences. Mine risk education (MRE), began
in the refugee camps in Albania and Macedonia, and
was continued vigorously. As a result, the monthly
figure of mine accidents fell continuously from 87 in
June to only three in December. Meanwhile, VVAF and
other organizations began addressing the urgent
physical, socioeconomic and psychosocial needs of
those who had already been injured.
The mine action community took advantage of the lull
in operations during the severe winter months of 1999-
2000 in order to clarify its strategy. Several important
decisions were made. Capacity was to be boosted for
maximum clearance in 2000, with an emphasis on
cluster bomb (CBU) disposal in springtime before the
vegetation would overgrow the conspicuously painted
bomblets. For the rest of the year, and in 2001, the
focus would be on clearing minefields and UXO other
than CBUs – tasks that would be difficult for local units
to address later. UNMACC would cease as a UN office
by the end of 2001, leaving behind local capacity to
deal with the residual threat. This strategy shortened 
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the time horizon considerably in comparison with
previous estimates of the time required for UN
involvement.
The resulting clearance timeline reflected the strategy
well. Measured by the number of dangerous areas
confirmed cleared, the mine action community reached
its peak capacity in fall 2000. At times, as many as
1,200 personnel were clearing landmines and UXO.
By December 2001, 1,951 dangerous areas had been
confirmed cleared. Another 276 were awaiting
clearance by the Kosovar Civil Security and Emergency
Preparedness Organization, which had received
training under UNMACC supervision. By and large, the
United Nations and its mine action affiliates had
achieved the desired final state.
VVAF mobilized for its contribution to the upcoming
Kosovo mine action response while combat operations
between NATO and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia
were ongoing. As early as 19 May 1999, VVAF shared a
concept paper for an impact survey with the US
Department of State and other stakeholders. At the
time, VVAF estimated that survey findings would be
available within one year from a request to participate. 
Figure 3: Cycles of Clearance in Kosovo
Two winter troughs (months 6-7, and 19-21) are visible. Months 8-11
correspond to accelerated cluster bomb disposal in Spring 2000.
Capacity was at its peak in Fall 2000. The lower curve in 2001 reflects
UNMACC’s exit strategy. 
By assessing the impact of landmine and UXO
contaminated areas, VVAF’s iMMAP empowers
governments and other stakeholders to target
mine action resources to those regions most in
need. In this drawing, a Kosovar child shows
deminers performing their work.
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VVAF modified its position following an advance
survey mission to Kosovo from 26 July to 3 August
1999. The normal impact survey format could not be
applied because knowledgeable local key informants
were virtually nonexistent among the returnee
communities, and because results were expected
faster than allowed under the standard impact survey
format. In its place, a survey process was sought that
would allow existing data collection efforts to be
integrated to support the IMSMA database, and to
create a socio-economic index of the impact of
landmines and UXO. During a follow-up visit in
September by VVAF’s Social Scientist Aldo Benini and
Senior Information Management Officer Chuck Conley,
data was available from several sources regarding
substantive areas. The Humanitarian Community
Information Centre (HCIC), another UN initiative,
contributed data about housing stock destruction;
NATO, The HALO Trust and others contributed
information relating to dangerous areas; the
International Committee of the Red Cross and the
World Health Organization (WHO) contributed data
regarding landmine and UXO accidents. VVAF
produced the first practical impact survey result, a
Kosovo map that cross-classified villages by degree of
destruction and distance from the nearest dangerous
VVAF’S CONTRIBUTION TO
MINE ACTION MANAGEMENT
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area. This was useful for winter assistance and
resettlement planning, but did not yet do much to
support decision making in UNMACC.
It was apparent that a larger effort was required in
order to make the various bodies of information
mutually accessible and fruitful. A vexing problem for
socio-economic surveys was posed by the absence of
well-defined communities in Kosovo. VVAF was
convinced that, with appropriate cleaning, sectoral
data could be assigned to the more than 1,400 census
tracts and could be integrated meaningfully in a
geographic information systems (GIS) model. VVAF
deployed Messick to work full-time with UNMACC. His
assignment was to create a decision support tool for
allocating clearance resources by 15 February 2000, in
time to support the spring demining season.
During Messick’s five-month mission, VVAF learned a
number of lessons in humanitarian information
management. Active data acquisition required a much
larger share of the total effort than expected. The HCIC,
housed by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) approximately 200 meters from
UNMACC, did foster a climate of liberal sharing, but
for data to be actually surrendered to UNMACC,
practical "give-and-take" opportunities had to be
created. Messick conducted interagency meetings to
rectify data standards that had not been self-
explanatory. He spent several weeks creating an
agricultural data layer from satellite imagery and
bartered this novel product with others who had
interesting data holdings such as population
distribution. Many relief workers and NATO liaison
officers became aware of his work when they procured
dangerous area maps from UNMACC, a service vital
for their safety and their agencies’ productivity.
An UNMAS report stated, "…one of the most
challenging problems [was] to filter out information
that [did] not add value to the overall mine action
programme" (UNMAS 2001: 10). It became obvious
that for VVAF’s contribution to qualify as a decision
support tool, it had to create a simple and coherent
model of the environment in which mine clearance
took place. And for good and timely results, only the
information that was relevant in the model was to be
collected, collated and analyzed. VVAF achieved this,
primarily by inventing the concept of the "essential
livelihood space" and by computing priority scores
from the relationships between dangerous areas and
components of that space. This concept will be detailed
in the following section.
The following comment by the evaluators of the UN
mine action program in Kosovo (Salomons et al. 2002:
46) captures the essence of this decision support tool: 
"By March 2000 (some nine months after the
establishment of UN MACC), the [VVAF] support
had come to an end. Now, finally, an information
system was in place that could describe where the
threat was, define the nature of those threat areas,
and rank the relative impact of mine/UXO
contaminated areas on the population - all of
which are needed for effective mine action
planning." 
In fact, the priority score system was in place on 10
February 2000; Messick remained in Pristina for
another month, training UNMACC staff in using and
updating the system.
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In the absence of well-defined communities and of
knowledgeable key informants, VVAF reasoned that the
socio-economic impact of landmines and UXO had to
be inferred from physical features. Features such as
bounded dangerous areas, administrative units, land
use, and settlement outlines can be overlaid in a GIS
and compared for their spatial relationships. These
physical features also provide social science with
information and data, when assumptions are made
about how people behave in a given space. In Kosovo’s
largely rural environment, people with limited
knowledge of the danger would have to make frequent
trips around their communities, on roads, into
farmland and forested areas while conducting the
essential activities of daily life. 
Together, these areas formed what UNMACC began to
categorize as inhabitants’ "essential livelihood space."
Some elements of this space were more frequently
visited than others – residential areas as well as areas
near roads and village centers. If contaminated, they
would likely pose greater danger than remote areas. In
this logic, an index was formed that assigned points to
each dangerous area depending on the land-use
categories with which it intersected.
To that extent, the essential livelihood space concept
was a distant kin of landmine impact scoring, which
considers, among other things, blocked resources and
facilities. In Kosovo, as previously mentioned, this
information was not available from the local
NUMBERS FOR PRIORITIES
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population. In order to move from the concept to a
viable model, VVAF’s Messick and UNMACC’s
Operations Unit were required to make a number of
assumptions. They defined a 250-meter radius buffer as
the typical impact area around cluster bomb target
points as supplied by NATO. Like CBU targets, most
settlements were known only by their central points.
A 500-meter radius buffer around these points was
assumed to contain most residences as well as
orchards, farms and pastures most often traversed. A
similar buffer was created 200 meters on either side of
all roads down to the unpaved farm track.
Creating these new shape features would not have
been efficient without a
modern GIS and application
of modeling routines such




automated the process of
eliminating overlap among
contaminated areas and of
merging the town and road
buffers. The composite
contaminated areas then
served as templates to map
out and calculate the area of
the livelihood space that
intersected with suspected
contaminated land.
VVAF then explored two approaches to practical
decision support, both validated against landmine 
and UXO incidents and from mine awareness 
educator preferences. 
The first approach was to classify districts and draw
attention to the most affected ones. The district
classification was simple. It used the percentage of the
district’s area covered by contaminated land. Multiples
of the median value – the value that divides the
population in halves – for all 327 districts in Kosovo
served as break points between no-, low-, medium-,
and high-contamination districts. This measure was
found to be significantly associated with the number of
incidents. About a fifth of the districts earned the grade
"highly contaminated," as shown in Table 1.
The second approach was to classify each dangerous
area. A weighting scheme assigned points for each
type of buffer or land type (agricultural and wood
foraging) with which the contaminated area
intersected. The sum of those points formed the
priority score. Scores were bracketed into low-, 
medium-, and high-priority ranges. The brackets were
chosen so that a danger area was high priority if it
intersected with a town buffer. To be in the medium
category, it had to intersect with at least a road buffer.
Areas with high-priority scores were more often found












Zero, for no contamination
Up to the median (0-1.3%)
Between 1 and 5 medians 
(1.3-6.5%)
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were very often close to the 373 community mine
awareness education centers run by NGOs. The latter
correlation was particularly fascinating because local
workers had a voice in determining the location of
these centers. The geographic distribution of the
centers expressed, however imperfectly, the popular
perception of the landmine and UXO threat.
UNMACC required the danger area classification to be
broken down by cluster munitions and other
dangerous areas. In both types, a significant portion of
the dangerous areas intersected with town buffers and
thus were high-priority areas:
The priority scores and the affiliated map layers and
summary statistics were ready for the Spring 2000
clearance season. They were revised in December 
2000 after vigorous field reconnaissance and clearance
during most of the year led to numerous eliminations
and a partial reevaluation of the remaining 
dangerous areas. 
Initially, it had been reasoned that multiple priorities
for sector programs (health, education, shelter
reconstruction, resettlement, and agriculture) would
allow the creation of priority rankings for dangerous
area clearance. These sector priorities would be
measured by proximity of contaminated land to relief
and reconstruction projects. However, this information
did not become available in useful time and quality.
Sector organizations outside mine action did not
produce consistent and sufficiently localized project
lists. Sometimes, in a kind of catch-22 behavior, they
would delay defining project locations until it was
apparent which villages would be cleared first. As a
result, the priority
score essentially was
a measure of incident





of their project sites,
the dangerous areas
in point would not
necessarily have a
high score on the
priority scale as they
had not actively
provided the inputs
necessary to factor in
their operational
priorities into the
scores. An example of this was provided when
UNMACC was told to arrange emergency clearance of
electricity distribution pylons in order to facilitate
electricity imports from Greece. Access to some
pylons, indeed, was blocked by landmines, and
deminers had already set out when it was found that
the lines as such had not been damaged in the war. 
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In a second clarification, VVAF and UNMACC
established that the district classification was not
useful in providing additional guidance for clearance
decisions. The operations unit created a management
tool known as the "task folder," containing all the
information collected and processed on danger areas
that clearance organizations would find efficient to
treat as one task. These could be single areas clearly
isolated from the rest, or multiple areas that were
nearby, overlapping, or potential duplicates (such as in
cluster bomb strike zones). Experience soon taught
that meaningful task folders held areas that were much
smaller than a typical district and often would straddle
district boundaries. A classification system for
dangerous areas that relied on only one dimension –
the priority score – was preferable for its simplicity. 
The district classification was not, however, abandoned
entirely, as mine risk educators unexpectedly found
much use in it. By overlaying highly contaminated
districts with awareness education sites and
settlements, they visualized communities that had not
yet been reached by any of the affiliated mine risk
education NGOs. Such maps helped to reduce
communication barriers between the largely clearance-
focused Operations Unit and the "softer," more
community-minded Education Unit.
Figure 4: Sample Map of Prioritized Dangerous Areas
The initial catergorization, in February 2000, of dangerous areas in a western region of Kosovo
that was particularly badly contaminated. The prioritization was updated at the end of the year,
after intensive field reconnaissance of the areas believed to be most dangerous. 
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In a simple world, UNMACC would have assigned
dangerous areas for survey and clearance starting with
those that boasted the highest priority scores, and then
subsequently worked its way down by decreasing
scores. Managing a clearance operation with
thousands of sites is a complex challenge under any
circumstance, and doing so through more than a
dozen different organizations, each with its own set of
skills, preferences and supporters, introduces
multidimensional decision requirements. Some of
these are resource-driven; some respond to short-term
tasks, and others to the desired end state. The priority
score would therefore be only one of several
considerations in determining how soon a confirmed
contaminated area would be cleared. Some of these
considerations needed to be addressed from inside the
mine action community and others from outside it, and
some were more policy inspired, whereas others were
more operational. 
We know very little about the pressures that actors
from outside the mine action community exerted on
mine action, and cannot represent them in our
quantitative influence model. For example, Kosovo was
infamous for the strength of some of its criminal
organizations, and many other post-war countries
PRIORITIES AND POLICIES
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struggle with persistent warlordism. It is reasonable to
assume that these quarters have a de facto influence
on the progress of mine clearance, welcoming it where
it provides jobs for some of their clients, obstructing it
if it does not do so significantly. However, virtually
nothing was known reliably on this subject, and it was
simply assumed that such obstruction did not occur in
Kosovo at the time. 
The distinction between policy and operational factors
is easier to capture. One of the policies that strongly
influenced the timing of clearance had to do with
prioritizing areas by munition type. Clearance during
Spring 2000 was focused on CBU areas in order to
remove the maximum number of bomblets before
overgrowing vegetation would make them invisible.
Afterwards, however, this policy was reversed, and a
new preference for dealing with minefields prevailed,
inspired by the exit strategy. UNMACC wanted to make
sure that the most difficult operations would be
completed by the end of 2001. By that time, UNMACC
wanted to ensure that the Kosovar EOD personnel,
who were being trained by some of the NGOs, would
be left to face primarily ordnance disposal tasks, which
require less skill and supervision than mine clearance.
Operational considerations were as powerful as those
driven by policy. Clearance organizations were anxious
to minimize set-up costs and thus applied for multiple
assignments close to one another in space and time.
UNMACC task folders already pointed in that direction,
but in practice batches of dangerous areas seemed to
have been cleared by the same operator, within a short
period of time and within neighborhoods slightly
larger than typical task folder areas. Maps of regions
with areas that were cleared in the same quarter year
and by the same operator suggest that such clusters
typically would not exceed four kilometers in diameter.
Another priority consideration might be derived from
that pattern. If UNMACC found it reasonable to hand
out clearance assignments in a two kilometer-radius
circle or smaller, did it take a holistic view of the
hazards that the various dangerous areas inside it were
harboring? In other words, did it look at the priority
scores of all the member areas? There was no stated
Figure 5: Influence Analysis
The existing data allowed VVAF to calculate the relative
influence, on time-to-clearance, of three policy and three
operational factors. The length of the bars express how much
the factor was systematically used rather than luck of the
draw. For example, more than 10,000 chance experiments
would be necessary to simulate one set of clearance times
that would make the priority score seem as influential as it

















First clear areas with





P A G E  2 6
policy of that sort, but if the priority score was
universally respected, one might expect that the scores
of all the dangerous areas nearby would weigh in. In
fact, VVAF had offered to facilitate that perspective by
calculating a mean score for each of the task folders
that existed in February 2000.
Two other immediately assessable factors were
introduced in the GIS system – dense vegetation and
slope greater than 20 degrees. These determined to a
fair degree which specialized resources could be put to
particular tasks. For example, the use of mine detecting
dogs is degraded in areas of dense vegetation. VVAF
calculated from Western European Union satellite data
whether any part of a dangerous area was steep and/or
covered by dense vegetation. These coarse yes/no
attributes could be visualized on maps; surveys would
later refine the information.
Given those multiple considerations and others (such
as different freezing periods by altitude and time of
year), which this analysis cannot take into account, the
question no longer is: Was the clearance requirement
winnowed down by order of the priority scores?
Rather, it is: Was the priority score influential in the
timing of clearance tasks at all? And if so, how does
this influence compare with that of other policy and
operational considerations?
Fortunately, the data that UNMACC kept regarding
clearance operations is such that we can answer those
questions. For 1,619 of the dangerous areas, the data is
complete enough to estimate the relative strengths of
various factors that influenced time to clearance. The
1,619 each have at least one neighboring dangerous
area within a two-kilometer radius, letting us observe
the influence that clusters of dangerous areas had on
timing decisions.
Technical details of the model are given in the
appendix. The substantive results are graphically
displayed in Figure 5: Influence Analysis, on page 25.
The model considers three policy and three
operational factors, all of which were significant:
■ Policy factors – the priority scores (in the
December 2000 version of the scoring) of
dangerous areas, the scores of neighboring areas,
the broad nature of munitions; and
■ Operational factors – the timing of clearance of the
neighboring areas, the slope, and the density of
vegetation.
Two considerations were particularly strong in the
minds of the tasking authority and its implementing
partners. 
■ First, if the neighbors of a dangerous area were
cleared early on in the campaign, the area in point
also tended to be cleared early. This reflected a
strong desire on everybody’s part to economize on
logistics by clearing clusters of dangerous areas,
each within a short period of time. 
■ Second, the opportunity to pick up cluster
bomblets before the vegetation would overgrow
them during springtime 2000 and later the
opposite concerns to do away with minefields
before the exit of the international entities firmly
influenced clearance timings.
The priority scores manifested their influence in
two ways. 
■ First, areas with high scores tended to be cleared
significantly sooner than those with zero and low
scores. The strength of this influence was not
uniform over time, however. The five-month lead
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that high-priority areas held over low-priority ones
in mid-2000 vanished by the end of 2001. One can
only speculate that some of the minefields in
remote regions (particularly on the border with
Albania) were brought forward in the clearance
sequence to avoid passing these difficult tasks
along to the Kosovar EOD teams.
■ Secondly, the priority scores of immediate
neighbors were significant. In a cluster of
dangerous areas, low-priority areas that were in
close proximity to areas with high scores would
tend to be cleared sooner. Note that this influence
is both independent of, and weaker than the
logistical benefit of clearing clusters of areas
together. Practically, it may have worked itself 
out in constellations where an area itself had a
low score, but had neighbors intersecting with
town buffers. The higher scores of these areas
then secured this low-priority area some 
extra attention, above and beyond the
logistical consideration.
Figure 6: Clustering of Clearance Operations in Space and Time
The same segment of Kosovo as in Figure 4. Dangerous areas are reduced to point symbols showing the quarter year in which
their clearance was completed.
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Flat areas and areas without dense vegetations tended
to be cleared earlier. Note that these influences have
been inferred, as always, with "all other things being
equal." In particular, they were net of the influence of
the priority score. In other words, the priority score
took care of the fact that some areas were far from
towns and roads (low score), and if in addition they
were in forested or steep terrain, this would further
delay their clearance. It is not clear why the vegetation
factor had such minimal influence. The way it was
measured may have disguised part of its strength;
also, specialized clearance resources such as
vegetation cutters may have had to be kept 
employed continuously.
The mesh of decision factors, as unraveled in this
analysis, is fascinating. Clearance times were set out of
equal consideration for policy, techniques and
economics. The concern for hazard reduction as
embodied in the priority scores was heard. The nature
of munitions provided guidance through rationales
that changed over time. The partnership between the
coordinating authority and its partners was translated
into assignments of clusters to help minimize set-up
costs. In fact, the significant effects of the two cluster
factors – the priority scores of the neighbors, and their
actual times-to-clearance – indicate that the
coordination was so fine-tuned that policy and
operational considerations were hardly kept separate.
In retrospect, one of the major clearance organizations
regretted that organizations were given individual
tasks, rather than entire regions of responsibility
(Salomons et al. 2002: 107).
Thus, VVAF’s assistance in prioritizing dangerous areas
had a significant impact on the way the contamination
was all but eliminated in Kosovo. The degree to which
priorities interacted with operational concerns was
perhaps not anticipated. This was true also of the
inability of agencies in other humanitarian sectors to
communicate their priorities in terms of sites to be
cleared. Their slower pace in translating policy into
localized projects reduced the priority scores from a
socio-economic scheme to one that chiefly looked at
hazard reduction. Clearance decisions could not wait
for everyone in the rehabilitation community to 
make up their minds, and by February 2000, VVAF 
and UNMACC had a system in place that was ready 
to empower the Operations Unit to assign 
prioritized tasks. 
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An image of desolate ruins in Western Kosovo following the conflict. Overall, more than 60 percent of the
homes were destroyed, with some rural areas reporting almost a 95 percent loss. 
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The lessons that Kosovo offers for humanitarian
decision support have to be gleaned with care.
Headlines like "The Most Successful Mine Action
Program Ever" (Scott 2002) may express a value
judgment that is vindicated by the factual record, but
they do little to endear observers and managers
struggling in situations far less resourced. Also, in a
perspective rooted in Landmine Impact Surveys, data
collections that substitute remote measurements (as in
maps and satellite imagery) for community informants
may be creative but they will remain methodological
exceptions. To the credit of UNMACC, it invited
community input aggressively during its field
reconnaissance of dangerous areas.
Nevertheless, after peeling away the specifics of
Kosovo, a number of insights emerge that will likely
prove valid for information management and decision
support in other post-war reconstruction theaters. 
■ In the area of landmine and UXO surveys, the
close intermingling of policy and operational
factors will heat up the debate about the
relationship between impact surveys and technical
surveys. Socio-economic impact surveys (formerly
called Level 1 surveys) produce a priority
classification of affected communities. Technical
(formerly Level 2) surveys confirm the existence,
and reduce the area, of contamination. Rather than
THREE INSIGHTS
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leaving each other in peace (and to neatly different
professional domains), implementers of impact
and technical surveys will attempt to leverage the
perceived strengths of their mutual contributions.
This may happen in different mixes of district,
community and mined-area information elements,
and may take a long time to work out. van der
Merwe (2002) makes a practical proposal in the
context of the revised International Mine Action
Standards. In this approach, technical surveys will
be used to identify, within highly affected
communities, those areas that deserve priority
clearance on both socio-economic and technical
grounds. It relegates other areas in the same
communities to delayed clearance and/or marking.
■ A second insight concerns the relationship
between mine action and other humanitarian
sectors. At the end of his mission, Messick
observed that
"as compared to other reconstruction and relief
efforts, the deployment and use of IMSMA in
Kosovo placed the UNMACC and the mine action
community on the leading edge of information
technology operations in humanitarian
applications." (Messick 2000).
This observation is reinforced by the fact that
mine action benefited from more than the timely
arrival of a powerful database application.
IMSMA’s GIS extensions also allowed UNMACC to
represent the contamination spatially, making
UNMACC attractive to other players, who had an
incentive to trade their information for maps of
the mine threat in their operational areas. The
threat, however, stems from the dialectics of what
is known and what is unknown in a particular
space; it is known that the exact locations and
extent of dangerous areas are not well defined,
and it is not immediately known how much
residents and other players already know about
the nature of contamination in their areas.
Surveys, major portions of mine action
information management, mine risk education,
and clearance all work to reduce the unknown. 
Eventually, the spatial orientation of mine action
gives way to other reconstruction concerns whose
primary orientation is temporal. In Kosovo, the
closure of UNMACC almost coincided with the
municipal elections in November 2001, a
watershed event in political culture and power. The
limitation is evident: Only small parts of the mine
action information holdings can be usefully
transferred to other sectors; transfers may meet
with selective barriers in organizational,
technological and focus terms. In fact, the GIS and
census underpinnings of the elections were laid by
the UN’s Humanitarian Community Information
Centre (HCIC), not UNMACC. UNMACC’s
information base may have been of fleeting value;
its permanent merit was, in a manner of speaking,
that voters walked to their polling stations safely.
■ A third insight will pave the way to a broader view
of decision support in the humanitarian field. The
main difference between decision support systems
and other information systems, as Gregory
Kersten reminds us (1999: 41), lies in the model
component: Decision support systems have formal
quantitative models as integral parts. In Kosovo,
one of VVAF’s chief contributions was to create a
quantitative scoring system for dangerous areas,
derived from the sociological model of an
essential livelihood space, and validated against
external (incident and mine risk education)
information. In other countries, impact surveys
have applied a metric that mapped the socio-
economic, victim and munitions aspects of
contamination onto a single numeric variable, 
the impact score (Benini 2000). And, stepping
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outside of mine action, the HCIC’s involvement in
the elections helped the Kosovars do what most
voting systems do: decide the distribution of
power by the count of votes. By contrast, an
earlier HCIC initiative, the Rapid Village
Assessment, may have been "a comprehensive
information-gathering exercise that assessed
humanitarian needs down to the village level"
(Currion 2001: 19), but it was not a decision
support system. It included no quantitative model
representing decision alternatives.
A Kosovar child used popular television
characters to represent the plight of landmine
and UXO victims.
This painting by another Kosovar youth shows 
essential livelihood space returned to productive use. 
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The ingredients for improved decision support in mine
action are thus known:
■ Further development of survey methodologies
within mine action and beyond;
■ Improved information management through
further development of IMSMA, and selective
transfers of elements to and from it, notably on a
GIS platform; and,
■ The development – opportunistically where it
promises net benefits – of decision support tools
that formalize the creation and evaluation of
practical alternatives.
A number of future developments seem plausible in
each of those areas, and VVAF seeks to be an active
contributor to those efforts:
Future landmine and UXO surveys will not likely go
back on the approved concept of socio-economic
impact upon entire communities. But the scope and
sequence of survey types may change. In addition to
enhanced technical surveys, we may see a split
between stripped-down rapid emergency surveys with
some socio-economic component and more
comprehensive surveys that correlate data on
explosive remnants of war with information bodies
THE WAY FORWARD
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from other sectors such as agricultural surveys. In this
example, the agricultural survey would supply values,
based on land productivity, that inform cost-benefit
models for clearing areas that have defined land use
potential. Such opportunities to combine the survey
needs of different sectors are essentially unpredictable,
but they must be actively seized. They may arise in any
post-conflict rehabilitation situation with diverse
information-gathering bodies and may be pursued by
any mine action partner present there. VVAF hopes that
the Landmine/UXO Impact Survey in Vietnam will be a
model for combining survey data with external data on
alleviating poverty.
Although VVAF may not be key to the technical
development of IMSMA, it has served as a translator of
information into knowledge. VVAF has staff certified as
IMSMA trainers, and it has authored the templates to
extract from IMSMA the specific data that feeds the
core analyses in Landmine Impact Survey country
reports. As opportunities arise, VVAF is well placed 
to create added value as a bridge builder between
IMSMA and other stakeholders who offer relevant 
data holdings. In Nicaragua, for example, VVAF helped
the Organization of American States (OAS) and the
national authorities clarify the need and potential 
for a full Landmine Impact Survey. The advanced stage
of clearance and the difficulty of attributing impacts 
to meaningfully defined communities suggested 
the use of GIS visualizations of landmine facets 
other than a formal impact score. The results can 
be found on the IMSMA Web site:
(http://www.imsma.ethz.ch/en/project/countryedition.asp).
The rigor and discipline of information management in
mine action can be applied to the benefit of other
humanitarian sectors. VVAF observed, with some
surprise, the co-existence, but sparse cross-fertilization,
of GIS-enabled information bodies in the Kosovo
UNMACC and its neighbor, the HCIC. Physically
separated by only about 200 meters along a main
street, the two UN centers were worlds apart, both in
their substantive orientations and in their ability to
enforce information sharing among their
constituencies. A practical result of VVAF’s
reconstruction experience in Kosovo is its investment
in supporting the UN’s humanitarian information
center for Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Information
Management Service (AIMS). This is an experiment, as
the organizational environment for reconstruction in
that country is turbulent, and there are no guarantees
that the center can acquire enough coherent data to
support better decision-making in a sustained manner.
VVAF’s Messick is assembling foundational information
on Afghanistan’s 30,000 communities and 300+
districts.. He embodies VVAF’s hope that the extension
of its advocacy role into new practical venues gives
countries like Afghanistan tools and opportunities for
better post-war reconstruction. 
In sum, it is obvious why the decision support tools
developed in the context of the Landmine Impact
Survey framework are important. They matter on
several counts. 
■ By making humanitarian mine action more
efficient, they demonstrate that those who fought
for the Ottawa Convention are capable of
sustaining its implementation on the ground. 
■ By exploiting a technological edge, the mine
action community is setting an example that other
humanitarian sectors can emulate in developing
decision support tools. These may be sector-
specific or, in favorable situations, may even bring
information bodies from several sectors to
communicate and provide mutual support. 
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■ Finally, there is the economics of decision support
tools. Tools like the priority scoring in Kosovo
focus information collection on the narrow set of
"need-to-know" items that their conceptual models
single out as fundamental for decision-making.
With a total investment of about seven person-
months in staff and consultant time, VVAF 
helped prioritize clearance jobs in a campaign
that employed as many as 1,200 workers.
With the benefit of hindsight, we can say that those
priorities were used in actual practice. VVAF is
confident that post-war rehabilitation efforts in other
countries will benefit by further developing what
worked in Kosovo. Although war teaches that "from 
the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing can
be built," it shall not stop us from driving a straight
trial lane into a minefield with direction from the best
tools available.
Marked minefield boundaries like this one are commonplace throughout Kosovo. 
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ANALYSIS
Our analysis is based on 2,268 records of dangerous
areas that were confirmed as minefields, cluster bomb
strike areas or other UXO-contaminated areas through
reconnaissance efforts begun in 1999 and continued
through early 2001. These records were extracted from
the IMSMA data pool as of early December 2001. 
The pool also held records of 1,111 areas that were
discredited for various reasons; these are not part 
of our analysis.
We reduced the set through various stages. At first, we
retained 2,221 areas, each of which had a Dangerous
Area ID and one point with geographical coordinates.
From that set, we considered excluding 179 areas
whose points fell outside Kosovo. These represented
areas that resulted from the break-up of a large
suspected area winding along the border with Albania.
Eventually, we decided to retain these areas, assuming
that their benchmark points outside the province
boundary were artificial GIS constructs. We associated
each of the 179 areas with its nearest Kosovo district.
Next we excluded dangerous areas reported cleared
before the set-up of UNMACC in June 1999. These
areas may have been cleared by demining groups
before the war between
NATO and the Former
Republic of Yugoslavia, or
the confirmed cleared date
may have been entered




areas without a priority
score (as revised in
December 2000) – areas
for which UNMACC had
decided not to compute scores because they were
determined to be of no priority. Rather than exclude
these areas, however, we replaced missing scores 
with zeros.
Suspecting that areas in that set were duplicates if
their point coordinates, dates of confirmed clearance,
and priority scores were identical, we eliminated the
duplicates and retained 1,958 areas.
For these 1,958, we calculated the number of
neighboring dangerous areas within a two-kilometer
radius from their point coordinates. If they had any
neighbors within that distance, we calculated statistics
on their priority scores, distance from the area in point,
and days to clearance. Distances were calculated using
a Great-Circle formula in MS Excel. We used those
statistics as context properties for the areas in point..
Similarly, we let them inherit a number of properties of
their respective districts, notably the percentage of the
district’s area that was suspected to be contaminated
in early 2000. For space reasons, the amount of
descriptive statistics that we give here is limited to a
minimum. As one can take from the following table,
149 dangerous areas had not yet been cleared when
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The distribution of clearance dates and the survival
plot by priority class were constructed on those 1,958
records. The core of our analysis, however, is a
duration model that seeks to explain the relative
strength with which the priority scores and other
relevant factors determine whether a dangerous area
was cleared early during the lifetime of the UNMACC
program, late, or not at all. The duration model used
covariates for which some records had missing values.
125 areas did not have any neighbors within two
kilometers and thus had no defined median priority
score for their neighbor sets; for 338 areas, vegetation
and slope data was missing. As a result, the duration
model uses only 1,619 cases.
Technically, our duration model is a Cox proportional
hazards model with censored data and with some
discrete time-varying covariates. Days-to-clearance
(more correctly: days-to-confirmed-clearance),
computed from the date when UNMACC was opened,
is the dependent variable. Clearance is the failure
event (in the statistical sense). The following covariates
were used.
■ Neighboring areas, median days-to-clearance:
A context variable to estimate the tendency to
clear neighboring areas at the same time as, or
close to, the area in point. For hazard ratio
purposes, this was rescaled in months.
■ Neighboring areas, median priority score:
A context variable to estimate the tendency to
determine the clearance timing of the area in point
by the priority given to its neighbors. For hazard
ratio purposes, this was rescaled by 10 points.
■ Cluster strike area, was cleared in Spring 2000:
A dichotomous variable with value 1 if the area
was a cluster strike area and was cleared between
1 April and 30 June 2000, else with value 0, acting
as a time-varying covariate.
■ Other UXO, was cleared in Spring 2000: As above,
for other UXO areas.
■ Cluster strike area, was not cleared in Spring 2000:
As above, for CBU areas not cleared during 
Spring 2000.
■ Other UXO, was not cleared in Spring 2000:
As above, for other UXO areas.
■ Surrounding district, percent area suspected
contaminated:The percentage of the area of the
district that embraced the dangerous area’s
benchmark point that was believed to be
contaminated in February 2000. For hazard 
ratio purposes, this was rescaled by ten-
percent increments.
■ Dangerous area includes some dense vegetation:
A dichotomous variable with value 1 if the area
included any patch of dense vegetation, otherwise
with value 0.
■ Dangerous area includes some area with slope >
20 degrees: As above, for steep patches.
■ Priority score (as revised in December 2000):The
priority score as calculated from the essential
livelihood space analysis and as revised in
December 2000. For hazard ratio purposes, this
was rescaled by 10 points.
Minefields act as the base category for the nature of
munitions (that is, cluster bomb strike areas and other
UXO areas are the explicit categories). Using that
scheme, "Cluster strike area, was cleared in Spring
2000" and the following three variables in the above
list were the time-varying covariates:
■ Cluster strike area, was cleared in Spring 2000.
■ Other UXO, was cleared in Spring 2000.
■ Cluster strike area, was not cleared in Spring 2000.
■ Other UXO, was not cleared in 2000.
A limited amount of model output is presented here.
The final model was run on 1,619 cases, of which 1,412
were failure event cases (areas that were cleared), and
P A G E  3 8
207 were censored cases (12.8 percent of all cases).
The likelihood ratio chi square for the global null
hypothesis (all betas = 0) was 746.97, with 10 degrees
of freedom and a type I error probability of less than
.0001. Results for individual covariates are given in the
table below.
A positive sign in the coefficient indicates that an
increase in the covariate tended to accelerate
clearance. For example, if the neighboring mined areas
were cleared late in the life of UNMACC (high median
days-to-clearance), the area in point also would tend to
be cleared late.
These results – except for the contamination of the
surrounding districts (see below) – are the basis for
Figure 5: Influence Analysis, on page 25. The length of
the bars in that figure is proportional to the z-values
calculated from the chi squares in the Table 4. The 
z-values were used because the majority of the
covariates are indistinguishably significant with 
p < .0001. Figure 5, however, displays only one bar for
all the four time-varying covariates. For this bar, the z-
values were replaced by the square root of the
absolute value of this expression: difference in –2 log
likelihood for the model with, versus without, the four
time-varying covariates, divided by the difference in
the degrees of freedom (4).
VARIABLE





CHI-SQUARE PR>CHI SQ HAZARD RATIO
Neighboring areas, median
priority score (per 10 points)
Cluster strike area, was cleared
in Spring 2000
Other UXO, was not cleared in
Spring 2000
Surrounding district, percent
area suspected contaminated 
per 10 percentage points
Dangerous area includes some
dense vegetations
Dangerous area includes some
area with slope > 20 degrees
Priority score (as revised in
December 2000) (per 10 points)
-0.08 0.01 143.21 <.0001 0.93
0.14 0.07 4.79 .0285 1.16
0.71 0.36 3.80 .0505 2.04
1.46 0.30 23.89 <.0001 4.30
-1.56 0.09 283.70 <.0001 0.21
-0.41 0.07 37.14 <.0001 0.66
-.017 0.04 20.96 <.0001 0.84
-0.06 0.06 1.12 .2896 .94
-0.22 0.06 11.38 .0007 0.80
0.25 0.05 25.89 <.0001 1.29
Cluster strike area, was not
cleared in Spring 2000
Other UXO, was not cleared in
Spring 2000
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The “Surrounding district, percent area suspected
contaminated” yielded a coefficient with a negative
sign. In other words, districts that were rated highly
contaminated in early 2000 would see their dangerous
areas cleared late. This result is counterintuitive,
particularly since districts were classified by this
variable as highly, medium, etc. contaminated.
However, as we already pointed out (page 15), the
district classification was not used for clearance
priorities. These were determined using dangerous
area scores directly. One may speculate that highly
contaminated districts had many high-priority areas;
these would be picked out, together with their
immediate neighbors, for clearance first. The residual
areas in the district would be cleared much later, or not
at all, explaining the negative coefficient of the district
contamination variable. This is speculation; we have no
proof that it worked that way. Since we cannot
interpret this result, the variable is not included in
Figure 5.
In the main body of the text, we also presented the
vegetation factor as significant, although it is not
statistically significant. We justify this with a belief that
the dichotomous measurement of this variable makes
a Type II error likely. In other words, we may reject its
influence while in actual practice dense vegetation did
tend to delay clearance. In order to avoid confusion,
we are not using the term "statistical significance" in
the main body.
The Cox proportional hazards models were
implemented in SAS. There is no efficient algorithm to
compute the expected number of days to clearance,
given the actual values of the covariates for each case.
The five-month difference that we found between the
median values for high and low-priority areas (see text
to Figure 2: From impact surveys to clearance on page
13) is purely descriptive.
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